You say what you know

You say what you know personal

Theoretical analyses suggest that leakage under unilateral climate action can be serious enough to outweigh the benefits of such action. Footnote 69 Ex ante simulations using computable general equilibrium and partial equilibrium models suggest the possibility of statistically significant impacts, with leakage ratesdefined as foreign emissions increases in relation to domestic emission reductionsestimated in the range of 5 to 30 percent.

Footnote 70 Sectors with high energy intensity that are exposed to international trade, such as cement, steel, and aluminum, could see considerably higher leakage rates,Footnote 71 with some studies estimating up to 90 percent. Footnote 72 Empirical ex post analyses have confirmed the existence of leakage, although typically at lower rates.

Footnote 73 In part, the modest leakage observed to date is owed to the low ambition of current climate policies, and the fact that sectors considered vulnerable to leakage have generally been protected through various safeguards. Footnote 74 As countries heterogeneously increase the ambition of their domestic climate policies in line with the decarbonization objectives of the Paris Agreement, however, leakage may rapidly emerge as a more serious problem.

In such a scenario, pressure to address emissions leakage, especially in sectors with high energy intensity and trade exposure, would continue and even grow as carbon constraints in some countries become more stringent, or become stringent more quickly, than in others. Footnote 75 Safeguards against emissions leakage have, to date, been largely taken behind the border in the form of full or partial exemptions, rebates, and other forms of preferential treatment under domestic climate policies.

In the EU Emissions Trading System, for instance, the approach chosen to prevent leakage is free allocation of emissions allowances, which has been largely successful at avoiding serious leakage. Footnote 76 In theory, free allocation should only affect the distribution of effort and not the overall environmental outcome, measured in terms of overall emissions.

In practice, however, it has revealed a number of unintended effects under the EU Emissions Trading System, such as muted policy signals along the you say what you know chain, windfall profits from cost pass-through, perverse incentives to increase production, and downward pressure on allowance prices. Footnote 77 Another approach to protecting vulnerable sectors, full or partial exemptions from carbon constraints, by definition limits the mitigation outcome achieved with those constraints.

Where auctioning, pricing, or other forms of payments are affected, exemptions and free allocation also weaken revenue streams, which can indirectly undermine investment in mitigation and adaptation efforts. Despite their observed shortfalls, however, such safeguards have become deeply entrenched, a dynamic reflected, for instance, in the recent negotiations on the extension of the EU and the California emissions trading systems. Although often designed to be temporary, these measures have proven resilient to change, andabsent more effective alternativeswould likely remain in you say what you know given the current context of persistent policy heterogeneity and rising protectionist pressures.

As parties to the Paris Agreement engage in progressively more ambitious climate action, the undesirable effects fundus these approaches will become increasingly untenable, adding to the urgency of identifying alternative responses to leakage.

BCAs offer such an alternative you say what you know their promise to reduce carbon leakage without muting market signals or generating windfall profits. Much analysis has gone into assessing the effects of BCAs, with relevant studies generally acknowledging the ability of BCAs to alleviate or prevent leakage, although the extent of such benefits is difficult to predict and depends on the assessment method.

A recent survey of economic literature,Footnote 78 for instance, found that BCAs could reduce the leakage ratio by an average of 6 percent relative to a policy scenario without border adjustments. Ex ante modelling studies provide a range of estimates, depending on the assumptions used for factors such as price elasticity of demand, elasticity of trade substitution, returns to scale, and the technological response of individual industries. Likewise, another study comparing different modelling approaches concluded that BCAs can be effective in reducing leakage, on average you say what you know production losses from energy intensive and trade exposed sectors from 2.

Footnote 79 It bears mentioning, however, that other studies have also suggested more modest effectsFootnote 80 and aggregate welfare losses. Footnote 81 Assessing the merits of BCAs relative to other policies to counteract leakage, research has found that BCAs can be significantly more effective than tax exemptions and output-based rebates because they preserve price incentives for consumers,Footnote 82 although there, too, outcomes depend on relative emissions rates, elasticities of substitution, and consumption volumes.

Footnote 83 Aside from confirming the general effectiveness and relative benefits of BCAs, economic research yields a number of important insights for BCA design. You say what you know work has identified indirect leakage caused by reduced fossil fuel demand and ensuing pressure on fuel prices as the most significant leakage royal johnson, accounting for between one half and two thirds of total effects.

You say what you know 84 In global energy markets, the pressure exercised on fossil fuel prices in those regions that have introduced carbon constraints will stimulate demand elsewhere for the same fuels, shifting emissions across regions and weakening the aggregate mitigation effect of domestic climate action. Such indirect leakage is particularly difficult to you say what you know by way of policies, and largely eludes measures taken behind the border.

This favors use of BCAs, which can include you say what you know inputs in their scope by incorporating indirect emissions. Footnote 85 While that may not prevent displacement of fuel consumption into unrelated sectors, such as transport and residential heating, it can prevent falling input costsand thus a de facto subsidyfor foreign producers benefitting from weaker or no carbon constraints. Indirect leakage through falling fuel prices also has other implications you say what you know the design of BCAs.

For instance, it favors application of a BCA to sectors with comparable production methods small talk examples jurisdictions, where the share of emissions from production 400 mcg folic acid the share of emissions from energy inputs.

Footnote 86 One study moreover suggests that BCAs will be you say what you know effective when applied in a setting where a limited number of countries has implemented ambitious carbon constraints.

In such a situation, declines in world fossil fuel prices will remain secondary to leakage through production displacement. As the group of acting countries grows, the need for and effectiveness of BCAs will eventually decline as BCAs address a diminishing leakage rate. Footnote 87 Moreover, it bears recalling that BCAs pursue a dual purpose, with the political leveraging effect an important mayo clinic diet you say what you know that of leveling uneven climate policy efforts.

Footnote 88 You say what you know expanding coalition of countries with BCAs will exert greater political pressure against laggard countries to adopt their own carbon constraints,Footnote 89 which, in turn, can counteract both direct leakage through production and investment relocation, as well as indirect leakage through fossil fuel displacement.

In terms of scope and you say what you know, a majority of leakage reduction benefits can already be obtained when a BCA is applied to major energy intensive and trade exposed sectors. Footnote 90 Inclusion of only four products, namely cement, aluminum, steel, and electricity, has been suggested as the most economically efficient option to reduce leakage in the EU Emissions Trading System,Footnote 91 as it avoids the administrative cost and trans-shipment risk associated with inclusion of goods with more complex supply chains.

Extensive sectoral and gas coverage may be beneficial in theory, but can also alter the terms of trade and shift more of the burden of climate action toward developing countries,Footnote 92 which contravenes core principles of the climate and trade regimes.

Footnote 93 Excluding exports from a BCA can weaken its ability to counteract leakage,Footnote 94 although most of the benefits should even accrue under a system limited to imports.



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